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THE ABOLITION OF THE FORMS OF ACTION IN 
VIRGINIA 
W. Hamilton Bryson* 
The common law procedure for initiating actions at law in the 
English courts required a plaintiff to obtain a writ invoking the 
jurisdiction of the court and to file a declaration setting forth the 
facts that justified instigation of the suit and established the cause 
of the action. This clumsy and archaic system of litigation was 
abolished by a single chop of the legislative guillotine in New York 
in 1848. England followed suit in 1875, and the United States fed-
eral courts in 1938. Writs and declarations were replaced by simple 
forms which were copied from the practice of the equity courts. By 
contrast, Virginia painlessly and imperceptibly reformed the com-
mon law pleading over a two hundred year period. This article 
chronicles the stages of this development in the law of Virginia. 
The forms of action as a system of litigation originated in the 
royal courts of England in the eleventh or twelfth century, when 
the courts of general jurisdiction were the county courts, and the 
king's courts heard cases only in special cases as a matter of the 
king's special favor to a particular plaintiff. Instead of going to the 
local court, an aggrieved party, for a fee, could obtain an original 
writ issued by the king's chancery directing the royal court of com-
mon law to hear the case. The original writ gave the common law 
court jurisdiction over the case. 
Until the middle of the thirteenth century, the chancery clerks 
were free to draft new writs to authorize new types of litigation or 
forms of action. This, however, allowed too much discretion tore-
pose in the lesser bureaucrats since the power to issue new types of 
writs was the power to expand substantive rights, which was legis-
lative action. In the mid-thirteenth century, this discretion was re-
moved from the chancery clerks who were forbidden to issue new 
types of writs or to invent new forms of action. Henceforth, no new 
types of problems were to be solved by the royal courts. 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., Hampden-Sydney College, 1963; 
LL.B., Harvard University, 1967; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1968; Ph.D., Cambridge 
University, 1972. This article will appear as a section of HANDBOOK OF VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCE-
DURE (forthcoming in 1983) and is published here with the permission of the Michie Co. 
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By the middle of the thirteenth century the local courts had de-
clined drastically in usefulness and the royal courts of common law 
had become the principal courts of England, perhaps the only 
courts from a practical point of view. A plaintiff, in order to have 
an effective remedy in the common law courts, was required to fit 
his problem into or within one of the fixed, established original 
writs or forms of actions. The generalizations or categories of liti-
gation were called forms of action because each type of original 
writ dictated the type of process, the content of the declaration 
(the first pleading), the method of proof, and the type of remedy. 
The substance of the law itself was considerably influenced, if not 
determined, by the system of the forms of action. 
The plaintiff's initial choice of the correct form of action was 
crucial to successful litigation. The law of actions continued to de-
velop after the thirteenth century, although no new forms of action 
were invented. As the old forms were used for new problems, the 
law developed countless historical. distinctions, subtleties, and 
"traps for the unwary." During the nineteenth century, the forms 
of action were abolished in many Anglo-American jurisdictions.1 
Litigation by means of the common law forms of action survived 
so long for two reasons. First, the changing needs of society were 
met by the action of trespass upon the case, a general and expand-
able form of action. Second, the separate legal system of the equity 
courts sufficiently handled the major problems of law reform until 
the nineteenth century. 
By the end of the fifteenth century, the internal logic of the 
common law forms of action had developed the idea that all of the 
common !aw should be included within one or another form of ac-
tion. A problem was remedied by a single form of action and no 
other; there was no overlapping. It was a single logical system of 
remedies which did not permit a plaintiff any choice of forms of 
action. In practice, however, this strict theory came to be modified 
in a few narrow situations. 
Although ownership of real property could be protected in prac-
tice by writs of right or novel disseisin or ejectment, in theory each 
of these was quite different, because they were grounded on differ-
1. See generally J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 49-61 (2d ed. 
1979); F. MAITLAND, THE FoRMS OF ACTION AT CoMMON LAw (1962); 2 F. PoLLOCK & F. 
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 558-73 (8. Milsom ed. 
1968). 
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ent substantive interests. In 1602, however, it was decided in the 
court of king's bench, that a promisory obligation for a sum certain 
could be enforced either by a writ of debt or a writ of assumpsit.2 
In 1849, Virginia enacted a statute that provided "[i]n any case 
in which an action of trespass will lie, there may be maintained an 
action of trespass on the case. "3 This statute eliminated the prob-
lem of having to decide whether a tort had been committed di-
rectly or indirectly. Note, however, that the General Assembly re-
moved one subtlety from the use of the forms of action and 
introduced a new one. A skilled pleader would avoid the danger by 
always suing in case, but inasmuch as the legislature did not make 
the two actions simply interchangeable, the unwary or ill-trained 
lawyer might sue in trespass and be met with a demurrer on the 
grounds that the tort alleged was an indirect one and that case was 
therefore the correct form of action:' Subsequently, an 1897 enact-
ment directed that whenever an action of covenant would lie, the 
plaintiff might sue in assumpsit as an alternative. 5 
These blurrings of the boundaries between the forms of action 
demonstrate that the practicing bar found the ancient forms of ac-
tion as categories to be inconvenient. Although a lawyer who was 
professionally competent could handle the forms of action and 
even manipulate them to his client's advantage, these forms were a 
product of an age of relative political and administrative 
impotence. 
General forms of action, though in use in the equity and ecclesi-
astical courts during the fifteenth century, appeared much later in 
the common law courts. In 1705, Virginia passed an act which al-
lowed public creditors to obtain judgment against sheriffs or other 
collectors of public levies upon a simple "complaint" to the court; 
2. Slade v. Morley, 4 Co. Rep. 92, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602); Baker, New Light on 
Slade's Case, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 51, 51-67, 213-36 (1971); J. BAKER, supra note 1, at 282-90 
(1979). 
3. VA. CODE ch. 148 § 7 at 589 (1849); VA. CoDE§ 2901 (1887); VA. CoDE§ 6086 (1919); 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 8-866 (1950) (This section finally was deleted from the Code in 1977.). See, 
e.g., New York, Phila. & Norfolk R.R. Co. v. Kellam, 83 Va. 851, 854, 3 S.E. 703,704 (1887). 
4. W. J. Robertson, Address, 2 VA. ST. B.A. REP. 85, 86-87 (1889). Judge Robertson was 
correct, but in 1916 it was ruled that in an action of trespass, which should have been case, 
the statute of jeofails cured the failure to sue in the proper form of action, because the 
declaration alleged sufficient facts for the court to proceed upon the merits. Stonegap Col-
liery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 279-80, 89 S.E. 305, 307 (1916). 
5. 1897-98 Va. Acts, ch. 96, at 103; VA. CoDE§ 6088 (1919); VA. CODE ANN.§ 8-508 (1950), 
repealed by 1954 Va. Acts, ch. 593, at 765. Note, 3 VA. L. REG. 829 (1898). 
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the purpose of the act was to protect the creditor from delay and 
"a tedious law suit."6 
In 1732, a new act was passed that provided for various fees pay-
able to the secretary of the colony and the county clerks to be col-
lected by the county sheriffs. This act further provided that if a 
sheriff did not submit the fees collected, the secretary or the clerk 
could go into court and "upon a motion . . . demand judgment" 
for the sum due.7 This appears to be the origin of the present day 
common law motion for judgment in Virginia. A similar remedy 
was given to the treasurer of the colony in 17568 and to high sher-
iffs against their deputies in 1762.9 Note that common law pleading 
by motion for judgment originated as a remedy for public officials 
against other public officers in relatively simple legal situations. 
Not only was the pleading in summary form, but so also was the 
trial, since there were no trials by jury. 
The remedy of motion for judgment also became useful in quasi 
official situations during the eighteenth century. In 1748, private 
persons were first permitted to sue by motion on forthcoming 
bonds, 10 and in 1753, the general public was permitted to recoup a 
statutory fine for the sheriff's failure to return a writ of execu-
tion.11 It is interesting to note that this last mentioned statute of 
6. Act of Oct., 1705, ch. 9, §§ 8-9, 3 HENING's STATUTES 266. 
7. Act of May, 1732, ch. 10, § 8, 4 HENING's STATUTES 352 (continued in force by Act of 
Aug., 1734, ch. 10, § 9, 4 HENING's STATUTES 421, 422); Act of Aug., 1736, ch. 10, § 9, 4 
HENING's STATUTES 506, 507; Act of Nov., 1738, ch. 10, § 11, 5 HENING's STATUTES 53; Act of 
Feb., 1745, ch. 6, § 12, 5 HENING's STATUTES 344; VA. REv. ConE ch. 115, §§ 13-14 (1792); 1 
VA. REv. ConE ch. 85, §§ 22-25 (1819); cf. VA. ConE ch. 184, § 22 (1849); VA. ConE § 3519 
(1887); VA. ConE§ 3499 (1919); VA. ConE§ 14-172 (1950); VA. ConE ANN.§ 14.1-175 (Repl. 
Vol. 1978); see generally Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 
YALE L.J. 193, 215-21 (1928). 
8. Act of Mar., 1756, ch. 1, § 5, 7 HENING's STATUTES 12; see also Act of Feb., 1759, ch. 1, 
§ 19, 7 HENING's STATUTES 263; Act of Mar., 1761, ch. 7, § 4, 7 HENING's STATUTES 396; Act 
of Nov., 1769, ch. 12, § 4, 8 HENING's STATUTES 346; Act of July, 1775, ch. 5, 9 HENING's 
STATUTES 67; Act of Oct., 1776, ch. 25, 9 HENING's STATUTES 222; VA. REv. ConE ch. 84, § 7 
(1792). 
9. Act of Nov., 1762, ch. 5, § 11, 7 HENING's STATUTES 543; VA. REv. ConE ch. 80, § 27, ch. 
161, §§ 1-2 (1792); 1 VA. REv. ConE ch. 78, §§ 32-34 (1819); VA. ConE ch. 49, §§ 40-41 (1849); 
VA. CODE §§ 909-912 (1887); VA. CODE §§ 2835-2838 (1919); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-520 to -523 
(1950); VA. ConE ANN. §§ 15.1-86 to -88 (Repl. Vol. 1981); 1 C. RoBINSON, PRACTICE IN THE 
COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY IN VIRGINIA 616-19 (1832). 
10. Act of Oct., 1748, ch. 12, § 14, 5 HENING's STATUTES 534; Act of Nov., 1769, ch. 3, § 3, 
8 HENING's STATUTES 327; VA. REv. ConE ch. 151, § 13 (1792) (apparently changed by 1 VA. 
REV. ConE ch. 134, § 16 (1819)). See generally 1 C. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 591-602 
(1832). 
11. Act of Nov., 1753, ch. 1, § 35, 6 HENING's STATUTES 344; Act of Oct., 1791, ch. 3, § 5, 
13 HENING's STATUTES 246; VA. REv. ConE ch. 151, §50, ch. 176, § 8 (1792); 1 VA. REv. ConE 
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1753 was the first explicitly to call the pleading a "motion for judg-
ment." An appearance bail-or the sheriff where there was no 
bail-could have summary proceedings against a defendant for de-
fault of the defendant's appearance.12 Not long after Indepen-
dence, if an attorney received monies on behalf of his client, he 
could be sued for them by motion in a manner similar to sheriffs 
who had received public monies.13 
In 1710, this procedure was extended to purely private litigation 
for small debts. A private person could sue another by motion for 
judgment where the sum demanded was less than twenty shillings 
or two hundred pounds of tobacco.14 Summary procedure for the 
litigation of small claims has been allowed in Virginia ever since.111 
In 1786, motion pleading was allowed to sureties against their prin-
cipal obligors for exoneration and against their co-sureties for 
contribution.16 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Judge St. George Tucker, 
a professor of law at the College of William and Mary, took a dim 
view of motion pleading, because it defeated the right to a jury 
trial at common law.17 But the trend toward simpler pleading con-
tinued, and by 1832, when Conway Robinson published the first 
volume of his Practice in the Courts of Law and Equity in Vir-
ginia, the list of types of cases pleadable by motion for judgment 
was considerably expanded. It included, in addition to those al-
ch. 134, § 47 (1819); VA. CODE ch. 49, § 29 (1849); VA. CODE§ 901 (1887); VA. CoDE§ 2826 
(1919); VA. ConE ANN. § 15-516 (1950); VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1981); 1 C. 
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 610-13 (1832). 
12. Act of Nov., 1753, ch. 1, § 19, 6 HENING's STATUTES 332; Act of Oct., 1777, ch. 17, § 17, 
9 HENING's STATUTES 406; Act of Oct., 1788, ch. 67, § 29, 12 HENING's STATUTES 742; VA. 
REV. ConE ch. 66, § 29, ch. 145, § 4 (1792); 1 VA. REV. ConE ch. 116, §§ 4-5 (1819); VA. ConE 
ch. 146, § 6 (1849); VA. ConE § 2893 (1887); VA. ConE § 5777 (1919); VA. ConE ANN. § 49-27 
(Repl. Vol. 1980). 
13. Act of Oct., 1787, ch. 10, § 3, 12 HENING's STATUTES 473; VA. REv. ConE ch. 71, § 7 
(1792); 1 VA. REV. ConE ch. 76, § 9 (1819); VA. ConE ch. 164, § 10 (1849); VA. ConE§ 3200 
(1887); VA. ConE§ 3427 (1919); VA. ConE ANN. § 54-46 (Repl. Vol. 1978). 
14. Act of Oct., 1710, ch. 11, § 7, 3 HENING'S STATUTES 508; 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTA-
RIES, Appendix, note E, 57-58 (S. Tuckered. 1803). 
15. Act of Oct., 1748, ch. 7, § 5, 5 HENING's STATUTES 491; VA. REv. ConE ch. 67, §§5-6 
(1792); 1 VA. REV. ConE ch. 71, § 20 (1819); VA. ConE ch. 150, §§ 1-4 (1849); VA. ConE§§ 
2939-2942 (1887); VA. ConE§§ 6015, 6020,6022 (1919); VA. CODE ANN.§§ 16.1-77, -79, -81,-
93 (Repl. Vol. 1975). 
16. Act of Oct., 1786, ch. 15, 12 HENING's STATUTES 268-70; VA. REv. ConE ch. 145, §§ 1-2, 
ch. 175 (1792); 1 VA. REv. ConE ch. 116, §§ 1-2 (1819); VA. ConE ch. 146, §§ 6, 8 (1849); VA. 
CODE§ 2893 (1887); VA. ConE§ 5777 (1919); VA. ConE ANN.§ 49-27 (Repl. Vol. 1980); 1 C. 
RoBINSON, supra note 9, at 604-07. 
17. 4 BLACKSTONE's CoMMENTARIES, Appendix, note E, 56-63 (S. Tuckered. 1803). 
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ready mentioned, suits by a turnpike company against a delin-
quent shareholder, by the officers of the literary fund against trea-
surers of school commissioners, and by jailors and creditors for jail 
fees, etc. 18 
The next major step in the development of motion pleading oc-
curred in 1849. One of the many procedural reforms inaugurated 
by John M. Patton and Conway Robinson, the revisors of the 1849 
Code, permitted motion pleading for all actions to recover money 
on any contract.19 This allowed motions for judgment as an alter-
native to writs and declarations in debt, covenant, and assumpsit. 
The primary significance of this step was that it was the first pro-
vision directing the use of motion pleading for general problems. 
Patton and Robinson recommended this statutory change to the 
General Assembly, because the earlier use of motions for judgment 
had been so successful in the heretofore limited situations. The re-
visors predicted that the use of motions woUld gradually take the 
place of the traditional modes of pleading.20 Along with the general 
use of motions for judgment for money based on contractual obli-
gations, the 1849 Code provided that sach actions could be tried by 
a jury if either party so desired.21 
The lengthy sixty-day notice requirement retarded the popular-
ity of motion pleading for contract actions. In 1887, this was 
changed, and the statute was amended to require only fifteen days 
notice. 22 The remedy became quite popular once this delay was 
removed.28 
Procedural reform permeated the air during the last fifteen years 
of the nineteenth century in Virginia. At their second annual meet-
ing in 1889, the Virginia State Bar Association addressed the codi-
fication question. William J. Robertson delivered the first Presi-
dential Address on the subject. Robertson had been a judge of the 
18. 1 C. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 589-622 and statutes and cases cited therein; 4 J. 
MINOR, INSTITUTES OF CoMMON AND STATUTE LAW 1317-24 (1893); see also 2 H. TuCKER, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 242 (2d ed. 1837) (where motion pleading is given 
only a brief paragraph). 
19. VA. ConE ch. 167, § 5 (1849); VA. CoDE§ 3211 (1887); Millar, Three American Ven-
tures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193, 216-19 (1928); see generally 2 R. 
BARTON, PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF LAW IN CML CASES 1037-99 (2d ed. 1891). 
20. J. PATTON & C. ROBINSON, REPORT OF THE REVISORS OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 832-33 
(1849), quoted in Wilson v. Dawson, 96 Va. 687, 691, 32 S.E. 461, 465 (1899). 
21. VA. ConE ch. 167, § 7 (1849); VA. ConE§ 3213 (1887). 
22. VA. ConE § 3211 (1887). 
23. 2 R. BARTON, supra note 19, at 1392-93. 
1983] ABOLITION OF FORMS OF ACTION 279 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, serving there with distinction 
during the war until he was removed for political reasons by the 
Reconstruction government. He then practiced law with great suc-
cess in Charlottesville and subsequently was honored by his elec-
tion as the first president of the bar association. 24 In his address, 
Robertson advocated Virginia's adoption of a code of pleading and 
practice similar to the Field Code of New York; Robertson specifi-
cally urged the abolition of the forms of action and the merger of 
law and equity procedure. 25 
This address was clearly part of an organized discussion of the 
codification movement. The Annual Address at the same meeting 
was delivered by James C. Carter of New York, a nationally known 
scholar who opposed the idea of general codification. Carter argued 
against the general codification of private law and criticized in 
passing the New York Code of Civil Procedure.26 At the same 
meeting the members of the Virginia State Bar Association de-
bated whether Virginia should adopt the Field Code of New 
York.27 
This marked the beginning of a lively debate throughout the 
state on the subject of law reform.28 The idea of a wholesale adop-
tion of the Field Code quickly was vetoed, and discussion focused 
on two related proposals: the abolition of the forms of action and 
the merger of law and equity procedure. In 1891, a special commit-
tee of the Virginia bar association recommended that both propos-
als be adopted.29 In 1892, the bar association approved the recom-
mendations of the committee;30 however, when the committee 
24. A. Gordon, Judge William Joseph Robertson, in 7 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 129-59 
(W. Lewis ed. 1907-09). 
25. W. Robertson, Presidential Address, 2 VA. B.A. REP. 85, 90 (1889). 
26. J. Carter, The Provinces of the Written and Unwritten Law, 2 VA. B.A. REP. 95, 128, 
132 (1889). 
27. General Minutes, 2 VA. B.A. REP. 32-39 (1889). The abolition of the forms of action 
had been advocated two years earlier. Suggested Changes in Civil Procedure in Virginia, 11 
VA. L.J. 69 (1887); The Code Revision and Law Reform, 11 VA. L.J. 124 (1887). 
28. See Patteson, Law Reform, 13 VA. L.J. 677 (1889); Patteson, Law Reform, 13 VA. L.J. 
475 (1889); Patteson, Law Reform, 13 VA. L.J. 461 (1889); Graham, Sacking the Temple, 13 
VA. L.J. 809 (1889); McGuire, Remarks on Pleadings in Virginia, 14 VA. L.J. 21 (1890); 
Patteson, Law Reform-A Rejoinder, 14 VA. L.J. 65 (1890); Remarks of S.S.P. Patteson, 4 
VA. B.A. REP. 26 (1891); Pettit, Law Reform-A Rejoinder, 15 VA. L.J. 681 (1891); Patteson, 
Law·Reform-A Sur-Rejoinder, 15 VA. L.J. 745 (1891); Pettit, Law Reform-Reply to Sur-
Rejoinder, 16 VA. L.J. 1 (1892); J. Tucker, Presidential Address, 5 VA. B.A. REP. 85 (1892). 
29. General Minutes, 4 VA. B.A. REP. 26 (1891); Report of the Special Committee on Law 
Reform, 4 VA. B.A. REP. 44 (1891). 
30. General Minutes, 5 VA. B.A. REP. 22-36 (1892). 
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presented its proposed draft bills to the bar association the follow-
ing year, the general code of pleading, which included the abolition 
of the forms of action and the separation of common law and eq-
uity procedure, and several miscellaneous proposals were 
defeated. 31 
Although these efforts towards procedural reforms were not im-
mediately successful, the slow, careful, and deliberate pace of 
amendment and improvement continued. By 1912, any cause of ac-
tion sounding in tort could be prosecuted by motion for judg-
ment. 32 This remedy was expanded further to include the right "to 
recover money . . . on any contract, or to recover damages founded 
upon any contract, or for the breach thereof, or to recover any stat-
utory penalty."33 Four years later, suits for specific personal prop-
erty or damages in lieu thereof and suits "to recover damages in 
any action at law" could be prosecuted by motion for judgment.34 
From 1916 until the next revision of the Code three years later, 
the only major subject of litigation where pleading by motion for 
judgment remained unavailable was the recovery of possession of 
real property. The use of the action of ejectment remained obliga-
tory even though it was a form of action that had been radically 
altered by statute in 1849. The more bizarre aspects had been re-
moved, the fictitious parties of record were replaced by the real 
parties in interest, and a judgment in ejectment was declared to be 
res judicata. The revised action of ejectment replaced all of the 
traditional real actions. 311 
With the revision of the Code in 1919, motion pleading became 
an alternative to the ancient forms of action; and thereafter, any 
civil common law cause of action could be brought by a motion for 
judgment.36 Note that motion pleading does not affect the sub-
stance of the law or anyone's rights or obligations; it merely simpli-
fies the procedure or method of presenting the issues to the court. 
31. General Minutes, 6 VA. B.A. REP. 14-62 (1893); Report of the Special Committee on 
Law Reform, 6 VA. B.A. REP. 72-104 (1893). 
32. 1912 Va. Acts, ch. 11, at 15. This act was superseded and repealed as no longer needed 
in 1914. 1914 Va. Acts, ch. 18, at 28; ch. 123, at 203. 
33. 1912 Va. Acts, ch. 323, at 651. 
34. 1916 Va. Acts, ch. 443, at 760-62 (amending and re-enacting VA. CODE§ 3211 (1887)). 
35. VA. CODE ch. 135 (1849); VA. CODE §§ 2722-2759 (1887); VA. CoDE §§ 5451-5489 
(1919); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8-796 to -835 (1950); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8.01-131 to -165 (Repl 
Vol. 1977). 
36. VA. CODE§ 6046 & Revisors' Note (1919); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 8-717 (1950), repealed by 
1954 Va. Acts, ch. 593, at 765. 
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The motion for judgment must still set out sufficient matter to 
state a cause of action. 37 
Motion pleading was judicially encouraged from as early as the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Judge Spencer Roane pointed out 
in 1797 that such notices should be viewed with indulgence since 
they were acts of the parties, not acts of the lawyers.38 Although as 
the century progressed lawyers themselves used motions for judg-
ment more and more, the policy of looking favorably upon motion 
pleading continued. 39 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
grounded this policy on the more rational basis of preferring mat-
ters of substance to matters of form:'0 Still, the old but useful 
myth-or legal fiction-survived.41 
In view of its relative simplicity and with encouragement from 
the judiciary, motion pleading quickly supplanted the traditional 
practice. Three years after the enactment of the general provisions 
of the Code of 1919, one commentator stated that "[t]he remedy 
by motion . . . is supplanting the regular forms of action, slowly in 
some localities and rapidly in others."42 
In 1929, the Committee on Judicial Administration of the State 
of West Virginia published the results of an extensive survey of the 
use of motion pleading in Virginia. 43 Their report noted that 
[t]he motion for judgment procedure has practically supplanted 
the common law actions in all classes of actions, both in tort and in 
contract. The only exceptions are where there is a special statutory 
form provided, such as ejectment, and in cases of extraordinary rem-
edy such as mandamus, prohibition, etc. There is a practically unan-
37. E.g., Felvey v. Shaffer, 186 Va. 419, 424, 42 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1947); Security Loan and 
Trust Co. v. Fields, 110 Va. 827,829-30,67 S.E. 342,345-46 (1910); M. BURKS, CoMMON LAw 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 290, 295 (4th ed. 1952); 13A MICH. JUR. MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT, §§ 
8-17. 
38. Drew v. Anderson, 5 Va. (1 Call) 51, 53 (1797); see generally Millar, Three American 
Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 28 YALE L.J. 193, 219-20 (1928). 
39. E.g., Chesapeake & Western R.R. v. Washington, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry., 99 Va. 
715, 721, 40 S.E. 20, 21 (1901); Supervisors of Washington County v. Dunn, 68 Va. (27 
Gratt.) 608, 612 (1876). See also Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion Procedure, 24 VA. L. 
REV. 711 (1938). 
40. Mankin v. Aldridge, 127 Va. 761, 767, 105 S.E. 459, 461 (1920). 
41. Ransone v. Pankey, 189 Va. 200, 207, 52 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1949); Curtis v. Peebles, 161 
Va. 780, 783, 172 S.E. 257, 258 (1934). 
42. C. Morrissett, Legislation of 1922 of Special Interest to Lawyers, 8 VA. L. REG. n.s. 
81, 97 (1922). 
43. T. Arnold, J. Simonton, H. Havighurst, Report of the Committee on Judicial Admin-
istration, 36 W.VA. L.Q. 1, 67-68 (1929). 
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imous approval of this method of procedure among both bench and 
bar;14 
Not surprisingly, motion pleading further spread to the federal dis-
trict courts in Virginia;411 and by 1944, common law declarations 
had become practically obsolete.46 In retrospect, prudence and cau-
tion regarding one's clients' interests would dictate the immediate 
embracing of motion pleading wherever possible. Although some of 
the older members of the bar, thorougly familiar and competent 
with the old system, were slow to change, the younger generation 
readily adopted motion pleading .. Totally superseded in practice, 
the forms of action lay dormant for two decades before being abol-
ished in law. Although the writ of replevin formally was extin-
guished in 1823,47 and the writs of right, entry, and formedon in 
1849,48 it was not until1950 that the other common law writs were 
removed as possible alternatives to motions for judgment. 
Pursuant to statutory authority of long standing,49 the Virginia 
Supreme Court promulgated a new set of rules in 1950 that require 
suit be instituted by motion for judgment where recovery of money 
is sought in in personam actions. 60 The rule was amended almost 
immediately to include actions to establish boundaries, for eject-
ment, unlawful detainer, detinue, and common law declaratory 
judgments. 61 In order to assure the validity of the rules of court 
and, inter alia, to make explicit the abolition of the old writs and 
declarations of the forms of action, an additional act provided that, 
if a rule of court should be in conflict with a statute, the rule 
should prevaiP2 Four years later, the now superfluous statute al-
lowing motion pleading in lieu of the forms of action was repealed 
44. !d. 70-71. See also S. Patteson, Judgment by Notice of Motion in Virginia, 13 J. AM. 
Jun. Soc. 167 (1930). 
45. Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1936) (Cardozo, J.); Eley v. Gamble, 75 F.2d 
171, 173 (4th Cir. 1935). 
46. Shearin v. VEPCO, 182 Va. 573, 578, 29 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1944). 
47. 1822-23 Va. Acts, ch. 29, § 9, at 31. 
48. VA. ConE ch. 135, § 38 (1849). 
49. VA. ConE ANN. § 8-1.1 (1950); VA. ConE§ 5960 (1919); VA. ConE ch. 161, § 4 (1849). 
From 1916 to 1919 the statute actually required the Supreme Court of Appeals to prepare a 
system of pleading, but no such action was taken at that time. 1916 Va. Acts, ch. 521, at 939. 
See generally Bowles, The Course of Law Reform in Virginia, 38 VA. L. REv. 689-98 (1952). 
50. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:1, 3:3(a) (1950). 
51. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:1 (1952). 
52. 1950 Va. Acts, ch. 1, at 3; VA. ConE ANN.§ 8-1.2 (Rep!. Vol. 1957). With the recodifi-
cation of the civil procedure statutes, the former rule was restored by VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-
3(0) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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and the ejectment statute was amended to substitute the words 
"motion for judgment" for "declaration" throughout. 53 The current 
statutes mandate that pleading be done according to the rules of 
the Virginia Supreme Court. 54 
Thus were the procedural common law forms of action abolished 
in Virginia practice and replaced by the more simple motion for 
judgment. The success of this reform was due to its gradual intro-
duction and to its availability as only an alternative at first. So 
smooth and painless was this transition that when the forms of 
action finally were abolished in 1950, few were aware that an eight 
hundred year old institution finally had been laid to rest. Of 
course, statutory actions of ejectment55 and detinue56 remain effec-
tive, and a statute still is needed to deal with the effects of judg-
ments in trover.57 
Problems in pleading, however, have not disappeared. In stating 
the facts of a case, the Virginia Supreme Court, in 1958, character-
ized the substance of the plaintiff's pleading in terms of the forms 
of action. The court stated that 
[h]is motion for judgment was in assumpsit for the use and occupa-
tion of his land. His counsel stated in the argument on the defen-
dant's motion to strike that he was suing in assumpsit on the ground 
that the defendant "had no right to pass over the land to haul the 
coal and [plaintiff] was not suing for the damages as a result of the 
failure of defendant to properly [sic] maintain the road."58 
In this case the plaintiff's motion for judgment was in substance an 
action of assumpsit when it should have been an action of trespass 
upon the case. 
In 1965, the Virginia Supreme Court held that "the right to re-
coupment must be shown by a plea in the general issue, or nil 
debet, or non assumpsit; it cannot be used against a sealed instru-
ment."59 The references to nil debet and non assumpsit lead us to 
the rules of defensive pleading in the old actions of debt and as-
53. 1954 Va. Acts, ch. 593, at 765-66, ch. 333, at 424-25. 
54. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 8.01-3(A), -271 (Repl. Vol. 1977); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 17-116.4 (Cum. 
Supp. 1981). 
55. Id. § 8.01-131 (Repl. Vol. 1977). 
56. Id. § 8.01-114 (Rep!. Vol. 1977). 
57. Id. § 8.01-219 (Repl. Vol. 1977). 
58. Wagoner v. Jack's Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 742, 101 S.E.2d 627, 628 (1958). 
59. City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 205 Va. 919, 925, 140 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1965). 
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sumpsit respectively. 
It required legislative action in 1977 to overcome the rule of 
common law pleading that actions in tort could not be joined with 
actions in contract in the same motion for judgment. 60 "The forms 
of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."61 
60. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-272 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
61. F. MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 2. 
